Lecture 18: Policy Lab Impacts of health insurance expansion II

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 - More (less) healthy
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 - Etc

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 - Etc
- $\rightarrow\,$ There are many forms of selection bias!

From last time: Does health insurance expansion improve health?

Currie and Gruber/Hanratty (2016) are seminal studies of healthcare:

- Estimate impacts in 1980s-1990s USA + 1960s-1970s Canada
- Identification: DD + IV
- IV: Simulated instrument (eligibility rules)
- Finding: Healthcare expansion causes large increases in health

We may find the DD estimates unsatisfying...

Today: an additional estimation approach:

1 Finkelstein et al (2012): **RCT**

2 Baicker et al (2013); Baicker et al (2014) add outcome variables

A hugely prominent econ paper to randomize health insurance:

Research question: What is the impact of health insurance expansion on health?

- $\rightarrow\,$ What are the impacts of Medicaid on healthcare utilization?
- \rightarrow How does insurance impact expenditures?
- \rightarrow And how does it impact health?
- $\rightarrow\,$ What are the costs and benefits of Medicaid expansion?

Finkelstein et al (2012): Context

Finkelstein et al study Medicaid expansion in Oregon:

- Oregon Health Plan: OHP Plus and OHP Standard
- OHP Plus: Medicaid (low-income kids, TANF, pregnant women)
- OHP Standard: low-income families not eligible for OHP Plus (low assets; BPL)
- ... but households remained at low levels (only 32% electrified in 2014)
- OHP Standard: comprehensive benefits; no cost-sharing
- Premiums \$0-\$20 per month
- 2002: 110,000 people enrolled in Standard; \approx 300,000 Plus

Finkelstein et al (2012): Data

(CONTINUED)				
Variable	Control mean	Variable	С	
Education		Income (% federal poverty line)		
% Less than high school	0.177	<50%	0.	
% High school displom a or GED	0.491	50-75%	0	
% Vocational training or 2-year degree	0.220	75-100%	0	
% 4-year college degree or more	0.112	100-150%	0	
		Above 150%	0	
Employment				
% don't currently work	0.551	Insurance coverage		
% work <20 hours per week	0.090	Any insurance?	0	
% work 20-29 hours per week	0.099	OHP/Medicaid	0	
% work 30+ hrs per week	0.259	Private insurance	0	
		Other	0	
Average household income (2008) \$	13,035	# of months of last six with insurance	1	

TABLE I

Note: All estimation are reported for control individuals only. Panel A reports the control means for pressdomination dem oprophics taken from the lottery in and February 2006) for the whole sample (V = 45,056 for control). Age refers to age at the end of the study prot. Engine has no preferred language' in dicate wheth did not obset a host requesting materials in a language other than English. Panel B reports control means of lottery list prevandomination demographics and sursarvey responders (N = 1,953 for controls), weighted using survey weights. "Household income" is green household income (in a) for 2006 before takes and any cash assistance or userspring materials in a language other than English. Planel B reports control is green household income (in a) for 2006 before takes and deductio any cash assistance or userspring and the state of a state and a state and deduction details. For the insurance questions, we code as 'yma' if the respondent checked that insurance includes employer and privately paid innarance, the incursons, the walkprope (OHPMadicial, private, and other 'wo'n to research' in any: 'Private insurance includes employer and privately paid innarance, the incurson 'Medicare and other.' We treat responses for insurance an missing if the responder checked 'd dari 'd on' 'k now' or left all checkbours blank. We construct incurs fidenal jower' just based on or eld-reported (total) number of household members. Beso Chine Appendit 3 for the data.

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Finkelstein et al (2012): Data

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Program Evaluation

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RCT disguised as a natural experiment:

- January 2008: OHP Standard opened to new enrollment
- 10,000 available slots, but oversubscribed
- $\rightarrow\,$ Lottery to choose who gets in
- \rightarrow 89,824 on the list, 35,169 accepted

Finkelstein et al (2012): Intent to treat

Using the lottery as random assignment:

Estimate:

$$Y_{ih} = \alpha + \tau R_{ih} + \beta X_{ih} + \gamma V_{ih} + \varepsilon_{ih}$$

where:

 Y_{ih} is an outcome for person *i* in household *h*

 R_{ih} is an an indicator for whether household *h* was chosen in the lottery

 X_{ih} are controls for selection

 V_{ih} are controls for precision

 ε_{ih} is an error term

Finkelstein et al (2012): Balance

	Control mean (std. dev.)	Diffe	rence between treatmen	at and control
	for rull sample (1)	Full sample (2)	Credit report subsample (3)	Survey respondents subsample (4)
Panel A Match/response rates Matched in September 2009 credit data	0.663 (0.473)		-0.0043 (0.0037) 10.247]	
Responded to survey	0.506 (0.500)		()	-0.016 (0.0066) [0.014]
Response time (in days)	53.0 (57.8)			1.638 (1.088) (0.132)
Panel B: Prerandomization characteristics Lottery list variables				[0.104]
F-statistic [p-value] Pre-randomization outcomes		1.286 [0.239]	0.553	0.574 [0.820]
F-statistic [p-value]		0.543 [0.844]	0.921 [0.518]	1.266 [0.281]
F-statistic [p-value]		0.915	0.793 [0.726]	0.782
N		74,922	49,990	23,741

TABLE II TREATMENT: CONTROL BALANCE

.....

Finkelstein et al (2012): LATE

The ITT gets the impact of the offer; to get impacts of coverage:

$$Y_{ih} = \alpha + \theta D_{ih} + X_{ih} + V_{ih} + \varepsilon_{ih}$$

where:

 Y_{ih} is an outcome for person *i* in household *h* D_{ih} is an an indicator for whether household *h* got insured X_{ih} are controls for selection V_{ih} are controls for precision ε_{ih} is an error term

Finkelstein et al (2012): First stage

		Full sample		Credit report subsample		Survey respondents	
		Control mean (1)	Estimated FS (2)	Control mean (3)	Estimated FS (4)	Control mean (5)	Estimated FS (6)
(1)	Ever on Medicaid	0.141	0.256	0.135	0.255	0.135	0.290
(2)	Ever on OHP Standard	0.027	0.264 (0.0029)	0.028	0.264 (0.0036)	0.026	0.302
(3)	# of months on Medicaid	1.408	3.355	1.352	3.366	1.509	3.943
(4)	On Medicaid, end of study period	0.106	(0.045) 0.148 (0.0031)	0.101	(0.055) 0.151 (0.0038)	0.105	(0.090) 0.189 (0.0061)
(5)	Currently have any insurance (self-report)		(0.325	0.179
(6)	Currenty have private insurance (self-report)					0.128	(0.0077) -0.0076 (0.0057)
(7)	Currently on Medicaid (self-report)					0.117	0.197
(8)	Currently on Medicaid					0.105	(0.0063) 0.191 (0.0060)
(9)	Ever on TANF	0.031	0.0011	0.028	0.0021	0.023	0.0019
(10)	TANF benefits (\$)	124	(0.0013) -1.659 (5.813)	111	(0.0016) 1.543 (6.571)	100	(0.0025) -4.991 (10.984)
(11)	Ever on food stamps	0.606	0.017	0.594	0.018	0.622	0.023
(12)	Food stamp benefits (\$)	1776	(0.0029) 61.3 (15.0)	1787	(0.0035) 60.0 (18.8)	2202	(0.0054) 122.4 (33.4)
	N		74,922		49,980		23,741

TABLE III First-Stage Estimates

Finkelstein et al (2012): Utilization

HOSPITAL UTILIZATION

	Control						
	mean	ITT	LATE	p-values			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)			
Panel A: Extensive margin							
All hospital admissions	0.067	0.0054	0.021	[0.004]			
	(0.250)	(0.0019)	(0.0074)				
Admissions through ER	0.048	0.0018	0.0070	[0.265]			
-	(0.214)	(0.0016)	(0.0062)				
Admissions not through ER	0.029	0.0041	0.016	[0.002]			
_	(0.167)	(0.0013)	(0.0051)				
Panel B: All hospital admissions							
Days	0.498	0.026	0.101	[0.329]			
	(3.795)	(0.027)	(0.104)	$\{0.328\}$			
List charges	2,613	258	1,009	[0.077]			
	(19,942)	(146)	(569)	{0.106}			
Procedures	0.155	0.018	0.070	[0.031]			
	(1.08)	(0.0083)	(0.032)	$\{0.059\}$			
Standardized treatment effect		0.012	0.047	[0.073]			
		(0.0067)	(0.026)				
Panel C: Admissions through ER							
Days	0.299	0.023	0.089	[0.183]			
	(2.326)	(0.017)	(0.067)	$\{0.187\}$			
List charges	1,502	163	636	[0.091]			
	(12,749)	(96)	(376)	$\{0.171\}$			
Procedures	0.081	0.0080	0.031	[0.135]			
	(0.694)	(0.0054)	(0.021)	$\{0.187\}$			
Standardized treatment effect		0.011	0.044	[0.100]			
		(0.0069)	(0.027)				
Panel D: Admissions not through	ER						
Days	0.199	0.0033	0.013	[0.841]			
	(2.38)	(0.017)	(0.065)	$\{0.842\}$			
List charges	1,110	98	384	[0.281]			
	(12, 422)	(91)	(356)	$\{0.383\}$			
Procedures	0.075	0.010	0.038	[0.080]			
	(0.708)	(0.0056)	(0.022)	$\{0.162\}$			
Standardized treatment effect		0.0077	0.030	[0.254]			
		(0.0068)	(0.026)				

Program Evaluation

Finkelstein et al (2012): Utilization

TABLE V

HEALTH CARE UTILIZATION (SURVEY DATA)

	Extensive margin (any)				
	Control mean (1)	1TT (2)	LATE (3)	p-values (4)	0
Prescription drugs currently	0.637 (0.481)	0.025 (0.0083)	0.088	[0.002] {0.005}	(
Outpatient visits last six months	0.574 (0.494)	0.062 (0.0074)	0.212 (0.025)	[<0.0001] {<0.0001}	(
ER visits last six months	0.261 (0.439)	0.0065	0.022	[0.335]	(
Inpatient hospital admissions last six months	0.072 (0.259)	0.0022 (0.0040)	0.0077	[0.572]	(
Standardized treatment effect		0.050 (0.011)	0.173 (0.036)	[<0.0001]	
Annual spending ^a					3

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Finkelstein et al (2012): Utilization

COMPLIANCE WITH RECOMMENDED PREVENTIVE CARE (SURVEY DATA)

	Control mean (1)	ITT (2)	LATE (3)	p-values (4)
Blood cholesterol checked (ever)	0.625	0.033	0.114	[<0.0001]
	(0.484)	(0.0074)	(0.026)	{<0.0001}
Blood tested for high blood sugar/diabetes (ever)	0.604	0.026	0.090	[0.0004]
	(0.489)	(0.0074)	(0.026)	{<0.0001}
Mammogram within last 12 months (women ≥ 40)	0.298	0.055	0.187	[<0.0001]
	(0.457)	(0.012)	(0.04)	{<0.0001}
Pap test within last 12 months (women)	0.406	0.051	0.183	[<0.0001]
-	(0.491)	(0.01)	(0.034)	{<0.0001}
Standardized treatment effect		0.087	0.300	[<0.0001]
		(0.012)	(0.041)	

Finkelstein et al (2012): Financial strain

FINANCIAL STRAIN (SURVEY DATA)

	Control mean (1)	ITT (2)	LATE (3)	<i>p</i> -values (4)
Any out of pocket medical expenses, last six months Owe money for medical expenses currently Borrowed money or skipped other	0.555 (0.497) 0.597 (0.491) 0.364	-0.058 (0.0077) -0.052 (0.0076) -0.045	$\begin{array}{c} -0.200 \\ (0.026) \\ -0.180 \\ (0.026) \\ -0.154 \end{array}$	[<0.0001] {<0.0001} [<0.0001] {<0.0001] {<0.0001} [<0.0001]
bills to pay medical bills, last six months Refused treatment because of med- ical debt, last six months Standardized treatment effect	(0.481) 0.081 (0.273)	$\begin{array}{c} (0.0073) \\ -0.011 \\ (0.0041) \\ -0.089 \\ (0.010) \end{array}$	(0.025) -0.036 (0.014) -0.305 (0.035)	{<0.0001} [0.01] {0.01} [<0.0001]

Finkelstein et al (2012): Payment







Finkelstein et al (2012): Health

Health					
	Control mean (1)	ITT (2)	LATE (3)	<i>p</i> -values (4)	
Panel A: Administrative data					
Alive	0.992 (0.092)	0.00032 (0.00068)	0.0013 (0.0027)	[0.638]	
Panel B: Survey data					
Self-reported health good/very good/excellent (not fair or poor)	0.548 (0.498)	0.039 (0.0076)	0.133 (0.026)	[<0.0001] {<0.0001}	
Self-reported health not poor (fair, good, very good, or excellent)	0.86 (0.347)	0.029 (0.0051)	0.099 (0.018)	[<0.0001] {<0.0001}	
Health about the same or gotten better over last six months	0.714 (0.452)	0.033 (0.0067)	0.113 (0.023)	[<0.0001] {<0.0001}	
$\#$ of days physical health good, past 30 days $\!\!\!\!*$	21.862 (10.384)	0.381 (0.162)	1.317 (0.563)	[0.019] {0.018}	
# days poor physical or mental health did not impair usual activity, past 30 days*	20.329 (10.939)	0.459 (0.175)	1.585 (0.606)	[0.009] {0.015}	
# of days mental health good, past 30 days*	18.738 (11.445)	0.603	2.082	[0.001]	
Did not screen positive for depression, last two weeks	0.671	0.023	0.078	[0.001]	
Standardized treatment effect	(0.410)	0.059 (0.011)	0.203 (0.039)	[<0.000]	

TADLE IV

Finkelstein et al (2012): Health

TABLE X Potential Mechanisms for Improved Health (Survey Data)

	Control mean (1)	ITT (2)	LATE (3)	p-values (4)
Panel A: Access to care				
Have usual place of clinic-based care	0.499	0.099	0.339	[<0.0001]
	(0.500)	(0.0080)	(0.027)	{<0.0001}
Have personal doctor	0.490	0.081	0.280	[<0.0001]
	(0.500)	(0.0077)	(0.026)	{<0.0001}
Got all needed medical care, last six months	0.684	0.069	0.239	[<0.0001]
	(0.465)	(0.0063)	(0.022)	{<0.0001}
Got all needed drugs, last six months	0.765	0.056	0.195	[<0.0001]
	(0.424)	(0.0055)	(0.019)	{<0.0001}
Didn't use ER for nonemergency, last six months	0.916	-0.0011	-0.0037	[0.804]
	(0.278)	(0.0043)	(0.015)	{0.804}
Standardized treatment effect		0.128	0.440	[<0.0001]
		(0.0084)	(0.029)	
Panel B: Quality of care				
Quality of care received last six months good/very good/excellent (conditional on any)	0.708	0.043	0.142	[<0.0001]
	(0.455)	(0.0081)	(0.027)	
Panel C: Happiness				
Very happy or pretty happy (vs. not too happy)	0.594	0.056	0.191	[<0.0001]
	(0.491)	(0.0074)	(0.026)	

Baicker et al (2013): Health

Table 2. Mean Values and Absolute Change in Clinical Measures and Health Outcomes with Medicaid Coverage.*						
Variable		Mean Value in Control Group	Change with Medicaid Coverage (95% CI)†	P Value		
Blood pressure						
Systolic (mm Hg)		119.3±16.9	-0.52 (-2.97 to 1.93)	0.68		
Diastolic (mm Hg)		76.0±12.1	-0.81 (-2.65 to 1.04)	0.39		
Elevated (%)‡		16.3	-1.33 (-7.16 to 4.49)	0.65		
Hypertension						
Diagnosis after lottery (%)§¶		5.6	1.76 (-1.89 to 5.40)	0.34		
Current use of medication for hy	pertension (%)∬	13.9	0.66 (-4.48 to 5.80)	0.80		
Cholesterol**						
Total level (mg/dl)		204.1±34.0	2.20 (-3.44 to 7.84)	0.45		
High total level (%)		14.1	-2.43 (-7.75 to 2.89)	0.37		
HDL level (mg/dl)		47.6±13.1	0.83 (-1.31 to 2.98)	0.45		
Low HDL level (%)		28.0	-2.82 (-10.28 to 4.64)	0.46		
Hypercholesterolemia						
Diagnosis after lottery (%)∬¶		6.1	2.39 (-1.52 to 6.29)	0.23		
Current use of medication for his	gh cholesterol level (%)§	8.5	3.80 (-0.75 to 8.35)	0.10		
Glycated hemoglobin						
Level (%)		5.3±0.6	0.01 (-0.09 to 0.11)	0.82		
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Table 3. Mean Values and Absolute Change in Health-Related Quality of Life and Happiness with Medicaid Coverage.*					
Variable	Mean Value in Control Group	Change with Medicaid Coverage (95% CI)†	P Value		
Health-related quality of life					
Health same or better vs. 1 yr earlier (%)	80.4	7.84 (1.45 to 14.23)	0.02		
SF-8 subscale‡					
Mental-component score	44.4±11.4	1.95 (0.03 to 3.88)	0.05		
Physical-component score	45.5±10.5	1.20 (-0.54 to 2.93)	0.18		
No pain or very mild pain (%)	56.4	1.16 (-6.94 to 9.26)	0.78		
Very happy or pretty happy (%)	74.9	1.18 (-5.85 to 8.21)	0.74		

TABLE 1-2009 EARNINGS

	Control mean (1)	Intent-to- treat (2)	Local average treatment effect (3)	<i>p</i> -values (4)	
Employment (any earnings)	0.5470	-0.0042 (0.0037)	-0.0156 (0.014)	0.266	
Amount of earnings	6,513.02 (10,227.30)	-51.74 (76.80)	-194.93 (289.00)	0.500	
Earnings above FPL	0.1314	-0.0032 (0.0026)	-0.0122 (0.0099)	0.219	

Baicker et al (2014): Benefits

	Panel A. Any receipt of benefits				Panel B. Amount of benefits received			
	Control mean (1)	Intent-to- treat (2)	Local average treatment effect (3)	p-values (4)	Control mean (5)	Intent-to- treat (6)	Local average treatment effect (7)	e p-values (8)
Food stamps (SNAP)	0.599	0.025 (0.0038)	0.0950 (0.014)	<0.001	1,494.35 (1,893)	72.75 (15.75)	276.19 (58.85)	< 0.001
TANF	0.031	0.0031 (0.0015)	0.0117 (0.0058)	0.042	111.36 (711)	2.62 (5.94)	9.89 (22.43)	0.659
SSI	0.050	-0.00024 (0.0017)	-0.0009 (0.0065)	0.888	30.63 (137.972)	0.25 (1.08)	0.93 (4.09)	0.821
SSDI	0.084	0.0017 (0.0014)	0.0066 (0.0054)	0.222	943.19 (3,401.323)	14.43 (17.33)	54.41 (65.31)	0.405

IABLE 2-2009 BENEFITS

TL;DR:

1 Oregon randomized health insurance coverage

- 2 Finkelstein et al (2012) find large benefits across the board
- **3** Same sign as the IV & DD estimates!